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As of 1998, nine percent of the shares of all firms in the US, primarily young and 
small ones, have been owned, essentially by about 17 million employees. The recent 
trend of new ventures to grant company-wide stock options plans is an alignment of 
the interests of management, shareholders, and non-managerial employees. This 
paper empirically explores the hypothesis that company-wide stock options plans 
primarily serve the interests of the firm‟s management. This is true, whether or not, 
management owns a stake in the firm‟s equity, though the degree of his or her 
motivation varies depending on the size of his/her stake in the firm‟s equity.  The 
paper unambiguously disproves the view that grants of employee stock options are 
meant to ease cash flow strains for small young firms. 
 
I. Introduction 
A recent trend among small new firms is to grant company wide stock options. 
In some industries, e.g., in the technology sector, at the time that the firm is 
established and well before it goes public owned, already exists an employment 
contract   with a provision about the grant of stock options that may be exercised up 
until and on the day the firm would go public.  Newly established firms find that to 
compete for skilled labor, they need to offer options to all employees from the very 
start of the firm‟s operations.  
Increasingly, new small size firms grant company wide stock options as an 
incentive plan. A study by National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO)
11
 
demonstrates that as of 1999, nine percent of the shares of all firms in the US, 
primarily new small firms,  were owned by 17 million employees. It estimates that in 
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the US, as of 1999, there were 16,100 such plans in effect, 3,000 of which were 
company-wide or “broad”2. By 1998, the number of such plans had undergone an 
almost tenfold increase from its level in 1975. Actually, only 15% of these firms were 
public, the rest were closely held and therefore small. Interestingly, most public firms 
allow employees a stake of less than 10% of the firm‟s equity, while closely held 
firms allow up to 30%. 
Boards of directors tend to think that “broad” plans are in shareholders‟ best 
interest. Recently, these boards have also been cited as favoring the grant of ESOs as 
a mechanism to attract skilled labor. Proponents of the opposite view argue that 
managers act in their own best interest, which runs against the idea that alignment of 
managers and shareholders interests should be observed. 
Several hypotheses, attempting to explain ESO plans, have been proposed in 
the literature (see Section 1.1). First is the „incentive‟ argument, which says that ESO 
plans induce real gains, manifested by higher employee productivity or reduction of 
agency costs. The above is induced, either as a reaction to an existing plan, or, in 
anticipation to the adoption of such a plan, as a reward for superior current 
performance. The second hypothesis states that the adoption of an ESO plan conveys 
some credible information, not already reflected in stock prices. 
The hypotheses so far pertain to the change in the firm's overall value, while 
the remaining ones refer to the conflict among the firm's various claimholders. 
Accordingly, the third hypothesis raises the possibility that an incentive plan may 
trigger tax benefits
3
, either to the shareholders or to the employees. 
The fourth hypothesis says newly established growth firms, which may not be 
in a position to meet their immediate cash flow obligations, could ease their strain by 
substituting deferred equity for cash wages. 
The final hypothesis says that an ESO plan may serve the interests and goals 
of the firm's top management. In this event, ESO plans are granted by managers who 
wish to maximize the value of their own claim. One implication of that is the “over-
retention” of funds, which arises when managers retain funds in the firm, for instance, 
by substituting some equity for cash wages, in order to increase the coverage of their 
own claim. Additionally, and this is the focus of this paper, managers may enhance 
their own interests, by making riskier or less risky investments subsequent or prior to 
an ESO plan, which may affect the value of the options held by the firm‟s employees. 
The natural question to the above is whether managers increase the firm's 
exposure to risk after granting an ESO plan, or, managers of riskier firms tend to grant 
ESO plans more often than managers of less risky firms do? The answer is not trivial 
and is somewhat different than the case in which options are granted solely to the 
firm‟s top management. In the latter case, managers have an incentive to undertake 
riskier investments in order to increase the value of their already owned, options, 
which, at the same time, may have a negative long-term effect on their equity-
holdings or reputation. With “broad” ESO plans, increasing the firm's risk may 
increase the value of the employees‟ options as well, therefore managers may have to 
share the benefits. 
                                                 
2  The NCEO study deals with actual share ownership, that is, plans that have granted shares 
(Employee Stock Ownership Plan – ESOP), or options that have been exercised (under Employee 
Stock Options plans – ESO).  Theoretically, however, stocks can be viewed as zero-exercise-price 
options, or options with a very low exercised priced can be viewed as leveraged shares. Thus, for the 
purpose of this paper, no distinction is made whether the plan is ESOP or ESO. 
3   Employee stock ownership plans are governed by sections 401(A) and 4975(E) (7) of the Internal 
Revenue Code and in section 407(D) (6) of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (FRI 
SA). See also  FASB exposure draft leading to SFAS 123 (Swieringa, 1987). 
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The increasing the risk in order to increase the value of the already owned 
options argument, can be erroneous. A positive relationship between risk and options 
value is applicable to firm-external options for a given share price. ESOs are firm-
internal warrants, whose issuance may affect prices. Thus, it is possible that 
increasing risk and granting ESOs will negatively affect warrants prices, if the share 
price declines sufficiently, in reaction to the plan and to the higher level of risk. 
 
I.A Manager’s motivation in granting ESO plans 
This study attempts model and test the manager‟s motivation in the decision to 
grant an ESO plan (the fifth hypothesis above). It adds previously disregarded 
variable, the manager‟s stake in the firm‟s equity. The interaction between this and 
other variables already analyzed, points to a set of interpretations variable than the 
conventional ones. The decision to grant an ESO plan and the extent of a manager‟s 
control, or alternatively, the threat of being diluted, are related to variables such as, 
the firm‟s risk, or, the manager‟s choice of the firm‟s level of risk, and the extent to 
which debt is used.  
Here the term manager-owner will refer to a manager who is supported or 
nominated by a major shareholder as opposed to a professional manager,  most likely, 
of a diffused-ownership firm, whose interests are not aligned with those of a specific 
shareholder. The two managers have different motivation in their decision making. 
This observation may lead to a non-linear type of hypothesis, i.e., the decision to grant 
an ESO plan may not demonstrate a monotonic relation with the above variables. This 
means that an ESO plan is more or less likely only when the extreme levels of some 
of these variables occur. 
The position adopted here is that ESO plans serve the interests of the manager-
owner, without any consideration given to the interests of other claimholders. The 
first hypothesis is that managers will increase the firm‟s risk when they grant an ESO 
plan, or alternatively, managers of risky firms will tend to grant ESO plans, if they 
have a controlling interest in the firm‟s equity. This paper will show that under a 
certain condition, the higher the firm‟s level of risk, the smaller the number of options 
the firm needs to grant. Hence, managers, concerned with the risk of dilution of their 
controlling stake
4
, will focus on the number of options granted to the employees, 
given the optimal overall value of the options package. This ensures that higher risk is 
associated with fewer options, and is not trivial, as demonstrated in Proposition 1. 
Actually, the value of the options increases with risk only when the firm's overall 
expenses-per-share exceed the difference between the firm's cash-inflow-per-share 
and the exercise price of the option. The paper demonstrates that the strategy of high-
risk ESO plans clearly dominates other strategies in conjunction with the following 
parameters: the number of options granted, the level of the managers‟ equity holdings, 
and the use of ESO plans as a mechanism to finance future wages, if the employees 
exercise their options and pay the exercise price. 
When it comes to claims on the firm‟s cash flows, the firm faces legal, stated 
by contracts, and practical priorities, dictated by business practices. The firm has to 
disburse funds to various claimholders in a manner that will best ensure its ability to 
continue to operate. Thus, the professional manager competes against other cash flow 
claimholders such as employees and debt holders. This paper hypothesizes the 
following: 
 
                                                 
4  Alternatively, the firm could have issued ESOs  that may be exercised to non-voting shares. These 
ESOs, however, are less valuable and thus will require issuing of more ESOs, and more importantly, a 
grant of ESOs of non-voting shares would lack the incentive argument underlying such grants. 
 86 
 
(i) The higher the firm‟s debt ratio, the more a professional manager 
will seek action to reduce “competition” on the part of other 
claimholders, such as the employees, who have claims on the 
firm‟s cash flows. Thus, granting an ESO plan that partially 
substitutes equity for cash wages, or, a potential increase in cash 
wages, serves this purpose. 
(ii) Even though the value of the claims held by the firm‟s employees, 
managers, and debt holders may not change, the grant of an ESO 
plan that substitutes equity for a cash-wage claim, increases the 
priority of the claim held by the professional manager. 
(iii) Grant of an ESO plan may substitute equity for cash-wages as a 
source of financing. Thus, as the firm‟s debt ratio increases, the 
more likely the firm is to seek this alternative form of financing. 
 
With the above in mind, consider two firms of equal equity size and equal 
equity risk. If one of the firms has a higher debt ratio, ceteris paribus, the overall 
firm‟s level of risk must be lower. Thus, the higher the level of debt and the lower the 
level of the firm‟s overall risk the more likely a professional manager will be to grant 
an ESO plan. The relationship, however, between risk and the decision by a 
manager-owner to grant an ESO plan, isolating for the firm‟s debt ratio, is 
ambiguous, since there is conflict between this manager‟s goal to protect his/her cash 
flow claim (i.e., higher debt and low risk are more likely to trigger the grant of an 
ESO plan), and his/her wish to protect his/her equity claims. That is, low risk is less 
likely to trigger the grant of an ESO plan. 
This paper will initially test the conventional hypotheses and proceed from 
there. If, for example, empirical evidence rejects the fourth hypothesis, and concludes 
that ESOs are not granted by firms because they are under a cash flow strain, the 
paper will then proceed to isolate the relevant parameters which are related to the fifth 
hypothesis. These parameters are: grant of an ESO plan, firm‟s level of risk, and 
managerial stake in the firm‟s equity and the risk of management‟s dilution of its 
controlling position. 
It is doubtful that any of these parameters alone can explain the motivation 
underlying the granting of ESO plans. This paper will first examine the relationship 
between the decision to grant an ESO plan, risk and level of control. Interestingly, 
while it is widely accepted that higher risk industries tend to grant ESO plans, the 
hypothesis regarding the risk level of individual firms may be rejected. If the sector‟s 
risk level can explain an ESO plans while individual firms‟ risk can not, then the 
measure of risk should be defined in relative terms, i.e., individual firm‟s risk relative 
to the firm‟s industry risk. 
Failure of the tests that consider the joint impact of all the independent 
variables to explain the decision to grant an ESO, will be interpreted as support for a 
non-linear relationship: at the extreme values of the variables - “high risk - high level 
of control” and “low risk low level of control” - the grant of ESO plans is more likely 
than otherwise. Thus, this paper will proceed in testing the cross-variables hypotheses, 
that is, testing, e.g., the relationship between risk and grant of an ESO plan, for a sub-
sample of firms with high level of control as opposed to a sub sample of firms with 
low level of control. 
In the event of confirmation of the non-linear relationship, we will interpret 
the result as support for this paper‟s hypothesis, which is divided into two parts: 
First, manager-owners will be inclined to increase the firm‟s level of risk upon 
the grant of an ESO plan, or alternatively, managers of firms with a high level of risk 
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will tend to grant ESO plans, if they have a controlling interest in the firm‟s equity. 
Second, firms with managers who do not own a stake of the firm‟s equity, will tend to 
grant an ESO plan the higher the firm‟s debt ratio and the lower the over-all risk level 
of the firm. 
 
I.B Review 
A large body of literature examines the motivation underlying granting of ESO 
plans. The Economics literature, for example, focuses on the “incentive argument”; 
namely, whether granting of an ESO plan enhances the firm‟s performance, or, 
reduces agency costs. As Conte and Svejnar (1990), point out, the results are 
inconclusive
5
.  
The accounting and finance literature explores the tax benefit hypothesis and the 
information effect. Hite and Long (1982), and Miller and Scholes (1982) discuss the 
tax hypothesis, whether the plan affects corporate tax, or the recipients of the benefits 
of the plan. Executive options and alignment of managers and shareholders interests 
are discussed in Noreen(1976), Larcker (1983), Brickley, Bhagat and Lease (1985), 
Tehranian and Waegelein (1985), Warner (1985), Healy (1985), Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987), Lambert et al. (1991), and Hemmer (1993). The results 
demonstrate significant positive stock price reactions to these plans, which makes it 
difficult to argue that these plans are merely “excessive perks” whose adoption may 
hurt shareholders. 
This segment of the literature is also concerned with the proper valuation of 
employee-stock-options, so that expenses reported by firms that grant these options 
will not be misstated. Additionally, it was argued that the adoption of plans reveals 
positive insider information that can serve as a credible signal. Specifically, a plan 
that involves a bigger equity stake for the senior management may be viewed as a 
disclosure of a credible signal (Brickley et al. (1985)).  
Managerial literature focuses on how employee motivation and performance are 
affected by incentive plans and disregards, however, the firm‟s point of view. 
Kraizberg et al. (2000) demonstrates that even when considering the employees‟ point 
of view, ESO plans are not necessarily superior to other incentive schemes. 
The key issue is whether the grant of an ESO plan triggers a redistribution of the 
firm's cash flows, or whether the real gains, induced by the plan, are allocated among 
the firm's claimholders. When a firm‟s claimholder, such as the manager, may take 
action that may increase the value of his own claim at the expense of other 
claimholders, one may wonder what stops him/her from emptying all other claims. 
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), Harris and Raviv (1979), Fama (1980), 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), it is clear that there are mechanisms that protect the value 
of the non-active claimholders. These are either external market mechanisms, such as 
the threat of take-overs, share prices reflecting that the firm‟s management has acted 
prudently or imprudently, or internal corporate mechanisms, such as the replacement 
of top management (Coughaln and Schmidt (1985). These mechanisms, however, are 
not practical when the top management owns the majority of the firms‟ shares. In this 
case, the managers‟ actions may not coincide with other claimholders‟ interests, since 
the managers are able to conceal their motivation, irrespective of whether or not they 
are internally monitored. 
                                                 
5  Interestingly, similar literature, dealing with executive compensation and relative performance 
evaluation mode, is also inconclusive (see  Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), 
Barro and Barro(1990),  Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker(1992), Aggarwal and Samwick(1998, 
1999).) 
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  Jensen and Zimmerman (1985) and Warner (1985)
6
 concluded that exists both 
direct and indirect evidence suggesting alignment of mangers' and shareholders' 
interests when management grants itself stock options. Therefore, there is a positive 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance or stock price 
reaction. 
Self-serving motivation has been discussed in the literature, with several 
implications. First, the self-serving view is reinforced when the managers‟ horizon is 
shorter than the corporation's infinite life (Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Tehranian 
and Waegelein (1985)). Managers may tend to take riskier investments when their 
salaries are linked to the firm‟s performance, as, for instance, when they grant 
themselves stock options
7
. This conclusion agrees with option theory, since a higher 
risk will tend to increase the value of those options (Agrawal and Mendelker (1987) 
Lewellen, Lorderer and Martin (1987), Lambert, Larcker and Verrechia(1991). 
Finally, the over-retention problem arises because managers have incentives to retain 
funds to increase the coverage of their fixed salary claims (Tehranian and Waegelein 
(1985), Lambert (1989)). 
Brickley et al. (1985) demonstrate that while introduction of long-term 
compensation plans increases shareholder wealth, when the latter is measured by 
abnormal returns of common shares, but yet, plans with option components show 
lower returns, though these results are not statistically significant. 
 
II. The model 
The number of ESOs granted is a crucial variable for a manager who owns a 
major stake in the firm‟s equity, and may therefore have to face dilution of his 
control. The model that follows does not go counter to the conventional view that an 
ESO plan will induce positive real effects, in addition, the model allows for the 
possibility that the grant of an ESO plan may substitute cash wages or cash wage 
increases. 
The model is a single period model, in which all cash flows are realized at the end 
of the period. However, decisions such as granting an incentive plan and reactions of 
employees and managers to the plan, occur at the beginning of the period. The labor 
market is competitive, the capital markets are efficient, and firm‟s securities are 
traded continuously. Transaction costs are disregarded and there is no asymmetry of 
information. 
Some important ESO aspects that are very unlikely to alter the paper‟s  
conclusions, are ignored. For example, it is implicitly assumed that whether or not 
there is a positive relationship between the grant of ESOs and increased employees‟ 
effort, the managers‟ motivation to grant ESOs, as described here, is not affected. 
The model considers a firm whose uncertain net cash flows are allocated among 
four claimholders: tax collectors, wage recipients, managers, who may or may not 
own equity, and non-managerial shareholders. Wages are initially assumed to be 
riskless
8
; that is, in any state of the world, the firm's inflows exceed wage claims. 
Managers may own a share of the firm's equity, while their compensation package is 
                                                 
6
  Cf. their review of    a series of papers  by  Murphy (1985), Benston (1985), Healy (1985), Brickley, 
Bhagat and Lease (1985), Coughaln and Schmidt (1985), Tehranian and Waegelein (1985), Johnson, 
Magee, Nagarajan and Newman (1985), Lambert and Larcker (1985), and Lewellen, Lorderer and 
Rosenfeld (1985). 
7 7    In principle, an ESO plan must be approved by the board of directors. It is easier for the managers 
to ask for board approval when it comes to a company-wide plan, rather than a limited Executive 
Compensation plan. See  Smith and Watts (1984), Coughlan and Scmidt , and  Brickley et al (1985). 
8  This assumption is not crucial since the conclusions of this model are reinforced if wages are 
assumed to be risky. 
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linked to the firm's total inflows and is subject to risk because their claim has a lower 
priority than that of wage recipients. Finally, the payoff of any security can be 
spanned by substituted securities. Specifically, there is a set of uniquely priced state 
contingent claims. To make the presentation simpler, without loss of generality, a 
simple discrete model is developed. There is a set of state contingent claims, which 
promise one dollar, if state i )( Hi occurs. Each claim‟s current value is qi , thus, the 
risk-free rate of interest, 
9
r f  equals  
 
1 1/ qi
i
H
   , i H .        (1) 
 
 Initially, the firm pays fixed wages in the amount of W , where the firm‟s cash 
flows are F i Hi ,  . W F ii , . 
 Senior management‟s claim is Mi . Thus, the net earnings at the end of the 
period, or shareholders‟ claim in state i, given the tax rate of  , is: 
 
E F W Mi i i   ( )( )1  .        (2) 
 
 The current value of equity is therefore: 
 
  
H
i
H
i
iiiii MWFqEqE )1)((0  .      (3) 
 
 The current share price is S E No o o / , where N 0  is the initial number of 
shares. 
The firm considers granting an ESO plan to all employees at the beginning of 
the period; the total number of options granted is Nc, whose value is C each, given 
that the exercise price is X. The ESOs expire at the end of the period after earnings are 
reported. The firm decides to grant an ESO plan, among other things, expecting to 
induce positive real effects, such as increased sales, increased productivity, etc. Let 
iB  be the net expected gains for state i. It is assumed that there is a well-defined 
relationship between gains and the overall value of the ESOs.  That is, the overall 
value of the ESO package and the level of the desired gains are exogenously 
determined (see Conte and Savenjar(1990). Thus, if there exists a unique optimal 
plan
10
, the firm needs to issue a package of options with value equal to *)(NcC , so 
that the package may induce the desired goal (such as real gains, lower agency costs 
etc.). Thus, 
 
*)(NcCNcC  .         (4) 
 
 It is assumed, initially, that the labor market and the market for managers are 
competitive; that is, managers and employees are substitutable, and competitive labor 
                                                 
9 This assumption by no means implies that the model assumes risk-neutrality. Rather, risk-aversion is 
imbedded in the value of the contingent claims, q. 
 10 As it is mentioned earlier, whether or not, there is a positive relationship between granting ESOs and 
B  is an important issue, but hardly relevant to the issue raised in this paper, therefore, we might as well 
assume that B, if positive, is given exogenously.  Similarly, the issue whether there exists an optimal 
contract does not alter the conclusion of this model. 
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markets dictate an implicit employment contract, according to which  , 0 1  , of 
the value of the real gains, Bi , are allocated, ex-post, to the employees 
11
.  is a 
market not a policy variable and need not be linear in Bi . Hence, if the labor market is 
competitive, the cash wages at the beginning-of-the-period, 0W , are:  
W W r Nc C q Bf i i0 1   






/ ( ) .  ,       (5) 
 
This equation implies that the actual wages employees receive at the 
beginning of the period equal )1/( frW  , set exogenously, and  iiBq are the net 
expected gains. These amounts are either paid in cash, 0W , or in options whose value 
equals NcC. 
 While the value of a single share before the issuance is S B0 , its value 
afterwards is: 
 
S E NcC N q SA i i
i
H
0 0 0  ( ) / ,       (6) 
 
where Si  is the value of a share, if state  i  is realized. This is true, since at the end of 
the period, if all ESO holders are rational, the price of a single share is: 
 






XifNcNNcXE
XifNE
i
i
i
S
)/()(
/(
0
0      (7) 
 
 and, 
 
C q MAX S Xi
i
H
i  {( ), }0 =  







i
i
i
NcN
XNE
MAXq 0,.
0
0     (8) 
 
 Equation (8) implies that the firm needs to choose the number of options, 
which in its turn affects the value of the options, so that the value of the package is 
*)(NcC . 
 In lieu of one of this paper‟s hypotheses, that the number of options granted is 
a crucial control variable for a manager who owns a stake in the firm‟s equity, 
Proposition 1 will derive the relationship between risk and number of options needed, 
given (NcC)*. 
 
 
                                                 
  11 The definition of a competitive labor market must be on an ex-post basis.  If it were an ex-ante 
implicit contract, then employees would have the incentive to underperform in reaction to the plan.  On 
the other hand, an ex-post contract is less realistic, primarily due to wage rigidity. If we allow, 
however, a multi-period scenario with memory, the ex-post contract is a reasonable assumption. This 
assumption also allow a trade-off between wages and otther compensation such as ESOs,  on  basis 
other than a dollar for dollar. 
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Proposition 1 
 If the labor market is competitive and the capital market is efficient in the 
sense that all securities are properly priced, then the following relationship is valid: 
Given that an optimal ESO plan must have a value of (NcC)*, the higher the risk 
level associated with management compensation, the lower the number of ESOs, 
Nc, a firm needs to grant under an incentive plan, if there is a state of nature, j, in 
which, 
 
XNMWF jjj 0)1)((   ,       (9) 
 
where jW  is wages in state j, 0N the initial number of shares, and X the exercise price. 
 Alternatively, the lower the risk management compensation is subject to, the 
more likely condition (9) is to be met, so that the negative relationship between risk 
and the number of ESOs holds. Thus, the larger the amount of wages that are 
substituted by the grant of an ESO plan, the less likely it is that condition (9) will be 
met. 
 
Proof 
(Available from the authors upon request) 
 
III. Data 
 The sample consists of 119 firms that are traded primarily on the NASDAQ. 
Data on firms that granted ESO plans were obtained from Proxy Statements 
(DEF14A) submitted to the SEC. We have established three sets of sub-samples
12
: 
 In 1999-2000, 42 firms reported that they had granted an ESO plan, 
and more than 20% of their shares are held by a group of three or less 
investors, or a closely related group. Firms, are controlled by another 
firm, are included in the sample only if the holding company is 
controlled by an individual or a closely related group. 
 In 1999, 38 firms reported they had granted an ESO plan, and no single 
shareholder held more than 10% of outstanding shares, and no group of 
three or less investors holds more than 20% of the firm‟s outstanding 
shares. 
 A randomly selected set of 29 firms which have never been engaged in 
an ESO plan, 12 with a controlling group and 17 without a controlling 
group. 
The ESO plans have the following characteristics: 
(i) Any single full-time wage recipient is entitled to participate in the ESO 
plan. 
(ii) All options granted under the ESO plan can be exercised to regular shares 
with unrestricted voting rights. 
(iii) All sample firms have gone public prior to 1999, and their ESO plans may 
have started as early as 1994. 
 
The first two sub-samples are mostly comprised of firms listed on the 
NASDAQ with foreign shareholders
13
 owning some of them, and 33 of these are 
                                                 
12 The first two sub-sets are believed to be an exhaustive list for this period, while the 60 firms in the 
third subset were selected based on the availability of data about holding patterns. 
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“technology firms”. This may create a potential bias, since one may suspect that 
“technology firms” are riskier, irrespective of this paper‟s hypothesis that managers-
owners, while granting ESO plans, tend to increase the firm‟s risk. Thus, in order to 
control for a possible “industry effect” we define an industry-adjusted risk measure 
(see section IV.2). 
A portion of the firms have granted an ESO plan before or on the date of the 
initial public offering
14. Both because they were about to go public and that „going 
public‟ is associated with the grant of an ESO plan, employees had expected the plan 
well before it had actually been announced. In most firms, the initial employment 
contract of most employees provided for a future ESO plan, contingent upon the firm 
going public. 
 
IV. Methodology and the results 
This paper hypothesizes that the decision to grant a company-wide ESO plan 
and the change in the firm's level of risk as well as in the firm‟s level of debt are 
linked to the issue of whether or not the firm‟s manager has a controlling stake in the 
firm's equity. Specifically, if the manager has a controlling stake in the firm, he will 
be inclined to increase the firm‟s level of risk, if an ESO plan is granted, or 
alternatively, the management of high-risk firms will tend to grant an ESO plan. 
On the other hand, firms whose management does not hold a controlling 
interest in the firm‟s equity, will tend to do the opposite, that is, an ESO plan is more 
likely as the firm‟s debt ratio increases and the over-all level of risk of the firm is 
lower. 
We begin by testing the hypothesis that states that the grant of an ESO plan is 
meant to induce real gains, which is not in conflict with this paper‟s hypotheses. 
 
IV.A ESO plan as a mechanism to induce employees’ performance 
The conventional view is that granting ESO plans is meant to induce and enhance 
employees‟ performance and therefore constitutes an alignment of shareholders‟, 
management‟s, and employees‟ interests. Thus, if we confirm this conventional view - 
and - this paper‟s hypothesis, we may conclude that granting an ESO plan is an 
efficient tool that induces real net gains, while also serving the interests of the firm‟s 
manager. 
The relationship between employees‟ performance and granting an ESO plan 
is tested through two variables: sales-per-employee in annual terms, and sales-per-
overall-costs of employees, (including cash wages reported by the firm, but not the 
value of the options granted through ESO plans). We also test directly the relationship 
between shareholder claims, earnings, and the grant of ESO plans. The results are in 
Table 1: 
We cannot reject the hypothesis of a positive relationship between employees‟ 
performance and the granting of ESO plans. We cannot say, however, whether or not 
firms with superior employee performance tend to grant ESOs as a reward, or whether 
granting ESOs positively impacts employee performance. This question is probably 
less significant in view of the fact that employees with superior performance 
internalize the likelihood of a future reward in the form of an ESO or a bonus plan. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
13
  In some foreign markets, such as Israel and Sweden, most firms are controlled by shareholders who 
have   majority-interest in the firm‟s equity. This  characteristic is widespread even though these firms  
are traded in the US. 
14  In some  firms in the first two-samples employees have signed an employment contract  whereby 
upon going public they   will be granted ESOs. 
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IV.B ESO plan as a mechanism to ease cash flow strains 
The key variables are the firm‟s level of risk and level of shareholders‟ 
holdings and the grant of ESO plans. Risk, however, can be alternatively linked to a 
different scenario. That is, one may hypothesize that growth firms, which are riskier 
by nature, are likely to have cash flow strains, and thus, ESO plans which can 
partially substitute cash wage obligations, may serve as a mechanism to ease these 
cash flow strains. 
The validity of this alternative hypothesis may be tested, either through the 
indirect relationship between risk and grant of ESO plans, or by analyzing the direct 
relationship between granting ESO plans and variables that are correlated with cash 
flow strains. If risk, by itself, is the explanatory variable, then we must observe a 
monotonic relationship between risk and granting ESO plans (see IV.3 below). Below 
we will present the direct test of the cash-flow-strains hypothesis. One may expect 
that firms under cash flow strains are more likely to grant ESO plans. 
We tested the event of granting ESO plans against three variables that are 
highly correlated with cash flow strains. The first two, Earnings per Share 
(EARNING) and Dividend Yield (DIV.YIELD) are both negatively correlated with 
cash flow strains. The third variable is Dividend Payout ratio (DIV.PAYOUT). 
We also believe that debt burden can be positively related to cash flow strains, 
that is, firms with higher debt-to-equity ratio (DEBT.EQ) will tend to grant ESO plans 
in order to ease some of the debt service burden. This variable, however, is tricky; in 
fact a positive relationship between debt-to-equity and granting of ESO plans may 
support the conventional hypothesis IV.2, that is; that firms under heavy burden of 
debt tend to ease cash flow strains by granting of ESO plans, but it can equally well 
support this paper‟s hypothesis in IV.4. But if the cash flow strains hypothesis, tested 
on other variables (EARNING, DIV.YIELD) is rejected, we may conclude that a 
positive relationship between debt-to-equity ratio and grant of ESO plan supports this 
paper‟s hypothesis.  The results are given in Table II.  
 The significant positive relationship between grant of ESO plans and earnings-
per-share, dividend-payout ratio, and dividend yield tend to support the rejection of 
the hypothesis that the major motivation for granting ESO plans is the need to ease 
cash flow strains, since the results indicate that firms with fewer cash flow strains 
tend to grant more ESO Plans than firms which do face cash flow strains. 
 On the other hand, the significant positive relationship between granting of 
ESO plans and debt-to-equity ratio could indicate that firms with a heavy debt burden 
may tend to ease this burden by granting ESO plans, and thereby reduce cash wages 
obligations. We suspect, that this relationship stems from another motivation, 
hypothesized here (see IV.4). We believe the results in IV.4 will support this 
assertion. 
 
IV.C Over all logistic multiple regression 
 Logistic regression estimates the probability of occurrence of binary event, 
given continuous values of the explanatory variables. 
Let the grant of an ESO plan be a binary variable with value „0‟ if ESO plan 
has not been granted, and „1‟ if it has been granted. We wish to estimate the 
probability Pr 
 
)11 ,...,,.../,1Pr( nnii xXxXxXESO  ,  ni ,1     (10) 
 
where X is the vector of the explanatory variables. 
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Pr(.)1
Pr(.)

 is the odds ratio, while 0<Pr(.)<1 , the odds ratio is an unrestricted positive 
number, and Ln
Pr(.)1
Pr(.)

is a well defined number. Thus we may make the assumption 
that 
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and the estimator for Pr(.) is therefore: 
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The first step is a simple multiple variable logistic regression where the model is: 
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..
...
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54321
   (13) 
 
where 
DIV.PAYOUT - Ratio of dividends payout to earnings 
DIV.YIELD - Dividend yield 
CONTROL - Fraction of shares owned by the controlling shareholders 
BETA - Level of the firm‟s risk measured by its beta. 
BETA.IND - Level of risk of the firm‟s industry measured by industry beta 
EARNING - Firm‟s earnings per share 
EMPLOY - Firm‟s number of employees 
DEBT.EQ - Debt-to-equity ratio 
BETA.DIF - We may need to reconsider the issue of measuring the firm‟s level of 
risk, since one may argue that the sample includes firms that belong to riskier 
industries. Interestingly, while it is common to think of higher risk industries such as 
the technology sector as tending to grant ESO plans, the hypothesis regarding the 
level of risk of individual firm may be rejected. This will be the case if this paper 
finds that sector‟s risk level does explain the grant of ESO plans while the risk level 
of individual firm, measured by BETA, does not. Thus, we believe that the measure of 
risk should be defined in relative terms, i.e., individual firm‟s risk relative to the risk 
of the firm‟s industry.15 Thus, we define the risk differential BETA.DIF, as: 
 
    {beta(i)/beta(I) – 1}, for firm i in industry I    (14) 
 
 The results are described in Table III. The first stage of the multiple variable 
regression re-confirms the finding in IV.3, that is, the motivation underlying granting 
                                                 
15  S&P 500 for NYSE listed securities, and the NASDAQ index for the remaining ones. 
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ESO plans may not be the firm‟s cash flow strains. Interestingly, using the stepwise 
regression procedure, the results indicate that the most significant explanatory 
variables for the grant of ESO plans are the dividend payout ratio, the debt-equity 
ratio and the industry‟s beta. This may lead to the conclusion that (i) prospering firms 
tend to grant ESO plans, perhaps, substituting conventional bonus plans to employees, 
and, (ii) firms in riskier industries tend to grant ESO plans. 
The lack of confirmation, so far, for this paper‟s main hypothesis is expected 
since the motivations that are believed to be the ground for the decision to grant ESO 
plans are different than the conventional ones, and/or are in conflict with each other. 
Thus, the decision to grant an ESO plan may be non-linear with respect to variables 
such as the firm‟s risk and level of control, that is; “high risk - high level of control” 
and “low risk – low level of control can both trigger an ESO plan. Verification of this 
hypothesis requires a different type of analysis, pursued in the next section. 
 
IV.D Risk, control and grant of ESO plans 
 This paper hypothesizes that the decision to grant an ESO plan, the firm‟s 
level of risk (either over-all risk or equity risk), the firm‟s debt ratio, and managerial 
stake in the firm‟s equity are non-linearly related. 
 A manager-owner would be reluctant to grant an ESO plan, if it threatens his 
or her control of the firm by diluting his or her equity position. However, since, the 
higher the firm‟s level of risk the lower the risk of dilution (see proposition 1), he or 
she will be more inclined to approve the grant of an ESO plan. Alternatively, 
management will tend to increase the firm‟s level of risk while granting an ESO plan. 
On the other hand, diffused-ownership firms in which management does not hold any 
interest in the firm‟s equity, will tend to do the opposite, that is, a decision to grant an 
ESO plan is more likely as the firm‟s debt ratio increases and the over-all level of risk 
of the firm decreases. 
Thus, we test the relationship between granting ESO plans and risk, while 
viewing „control‟  as an exogenous  parameter, for each of the following sample sets: 
 Firms which have or have not granted ESO plans, but have a group of 
major shareholders who control the firm and appoint their management 
team, and, 
 Firms, which have or have not granted ESO plans, and no shareholder 
effectively controls the firm. 
  
Then we re-shuffle the data and sort it by level of differential risk (DIFF), i.e., the 
relative level of firm‟s risk to that of its industry: 
 
 Firms which have or have not granted ESO plans, but DIFF is greater than 
zero, i.e., riskier than their respective industry, and, 
  Firms which have or have not granted ESO plans, but DIFF is smaller 
than zero, i.e., less risky than their respective industry. 
The results are shown in Table IV. 
 
Unlike the previous results in section IV.3., where these variables were tested 
simultaneously, the results here tend to support this paper‟s hypotheses: 
 
(i) Differential firm‟s risk level (DIFF) is negatively related to ESO 
plans when there is no controlling shareholder, but positively when 
there is a group of shareholders who effectively control the firm‟s 
decisions. 
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(ii) Level of control is negatively related to the grant of ESO plans 
when the firm‟s equity is less risky than its industry, and positively 
related when the firm‟s equity is riskier than their respective 
industry 
(iii) Though debt-equity ratio was a crucial variable in section IV.3, the 
results here indicate that this ratio is significant only for diffused-
ownership firms in which no shareholder effectively controls the 
firm. This finding supports our assertion that the relationship 
between the debt ratio and the grant of an ESO plan does not stem 
from the cash flow strains hypothesis. 
 
The results clearly demonstrate that firms which have granted ESO plans, can 
be dichotomized along the following two types of managerial objective functions: 
(i) If the firm is substantially controlled by a shareholder, the riskier its equity the 
more likely it is to grant an ESO plan. In this case, under this paper‟s hypothesis that 
relies on Proposition 1, the objective of a manager-owner is to avoid dilution of his or 
her controlling position by minimizing the number of options granted given a constant 
optimal value of the overall option package. 
(ii) Low-risk firms with diffused-ownership are more likely to grant ESO plans when 
their debt ratio is high, since the firm‟s managers are concerned with securing their 
cash flow claims. While this paper‟s hypothesis is related to the over all level of risk 
of the firm, we could not verify that „low-risk-equity‟ and „low-over-all-risk‟ have the 
same effect on the manager‟s decision. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The trend of “broad” ESO plans is often cited as a mechanism of improving 
employees‟ performance, or easing cash flow strains, or attracting highly skilled 
labor. The above arguments suggest an alignment of interests of all the firm‟s 
claimholders. 
Irrespective of whether or not granting an ESO plan actually serves the 
interests of the employees, the shareholders, and the firm‟s creditors, this paper 
hypothesizes that granting ESO plans serves the goals of the firm‟s managers, which, 
in turn, depend on the managers‟ motivations which stem from the specific type of 
their firms. 
This paper empirically supports that a manager-owner, motivated by the wish 
to avoid dilution of his controlling position, is more likely to grant an ESO plan, the 
riskier the firm‟s equity, while a manager of a diffused ownership firm, is more 
likely to grant an ESO plan when the firm‟s debt ratio is high and the overall risk 
level is low. The implication is clear. While the manager-owner‟s interests are in 
conflict with those of the employees and of the non-control seeker shareholders, there 
is an alignment of interest between those of the manager of a diffused-ownership firm 
and the of employees, perhaps because the manager perceives the employees, who 
have been granted ESOs, as potential supporters, in the event of an hostile take over. 
To verify this interpretation, one could analyze two important parameters of 
ESO plans: the exercise price of the options and the terms of payments for the 
exercise price granted to the firm‟s employees. This paper showed that, given the 
firm‟s level of risk, the lower the exercise price associated with these ESOs, the lower 
the immediate dilution risk, although the manager-owner can not avoid dilution in the 
future. This statement supports the observation that ESOs may be a mechanism of 
financing future wages.  
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Table I 
 
 
 High-risk firm Low-risk firm 
End-of-period  
outcomes 
post- 
offer 
present 
value 
End-of-period  
outcomes 
post- 
offer 
present 
value 
Favorable 
state 
Unfavorable 
state 
Favorable 
state 
Unfavorable 
state 
Value of firm's assets 572 175 356 472 300 356 
Management's 
compensation 
143  43.75 89 118 75 89 
Share price 1.95 1.3125 1.5 1.7318 1.5852 1.5 
Number of options 
granted 
520 
16
 780 
Exercise price of the 
options 
1.5 1.5 
The value of a single 
option  
0.225 0.15 
Value of options 
package to employees, 
substituting 117 of fix 
wages 
117 
 
117 
 
 
The number options that are granted under an ESO plan are given above for high and 
low-risk firms. In both cases, the firm‟s value, price per share, management and 
employees packages are assumed to remain unchanged as a result of the grant of the 
ESOs. Yet, the risky firm needs to grant only 520 options as opposed to 780 options 
of the low-risk firm. The numbers however were chosen so as to comply with 
Proposition 1. 
                                                 
16  We solve three equations simultaneously (6),(7),(8) and the assumption that the overall value of the 
ESOs granted  is equal to the total pre-offer fix wages  (4).  For example, share price of the high risk 
firm in the unfavorable state is (175-43.75+0)/100  and  (572-143+520*1.5)/620 in the favorable one. 
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TABLE II 
This Table presents the results regarding the issue whether firms under cash flow strains tend to grant 
ESO plans. 
ESO plans and cash flow strains 
  Variables         Statistics     
  Dividend yield (DIV.YIELD) Mean   1.21 % 
        SD  1.72 % 
  Dividend payout ratio (DIV.PAYOUT) Mean  17.78 % 
       SD  24.62 % 
  Earning per share (EARNING) Mean  1.10   
       SD  1.65   
  Debt - equity ratio (DEBT.EQ) Mean  1.70   
          SD   8.47   
Regressions Results             
1  DIV.YIELD = 0.031 + 1.478 ESO 
      (.1074)  (4.4369) * 
           
      F : 19.68(0.00)   
      R : 0.37812   
      Adjusted R : 0.13572   
      Standard E : 1.5801   
      Reg SumSq : 49.151   
      Reg MeanSq : 49.151   
      Res SumSq : 294.6   
      Res MeanSq : 2.496   
2  DIV.PAYOUT = 0.3332 + 22.3177 ESO 
      (.0082)  (4.761) * 
 
      F : 22.66(0.0)   
      R : 0.4014   
      Adjusted R : 0.1540   
      Standard E : 22.235   
      Reg SumSq : 11206   
      Reg MeanSq : 11206   
      Res SumSq : 58339   
      Res MeanSq : 494.4   
3  EARNING = 0.3906 + 0.8247 ESO 
      (1.324)  (2.428) * 
 
      F : 5.89(.017)   
      R : 0.2199   
      Adjusted R : 0.0401   
      Standard E : 1.5882   
      Reg SumSq : 14.876   
      Reg MeanSq : 14.876   
      Res SumSq : 292.616   
      Res MeanSq : 2.5222   
4  DEBT.EQ = 0.2974 + 0.7837 ESO 
      (1.320)  (2.983) * 
      F : 8.90(.003)   
      R : 0.2858   
      Adjusted R : 0.0725   
      Standard E : 1.1705   
      Reg SumSq : 12.196   
      Reg MeanSq : 12.196   
      Res SumSq : 137.01   
      Res MeanSq : 1.3701   
* Significant at 5% or less 
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TABLE III 
Multiple-variable Logistic Regression and Forward Stepwise (conditional). 
 
Logistic Regression 
 
1. Multiple variables         
         
   Classification Table    
         
  Observed     Predicted     
      0 1     
  ESO  P 0 14 19 42.42%   
  ESO  P 1 4 86 95.56%   
        overall 85.37%   
   Constant is included Cut off value - .5   
         
   Variables in the equation    
         
     S.E. Wald Significance   
  conatant 1.386 0.354 15.374 0.00   
      Score   Significance   
  div.yield   3.983   0.047   
  div.payout                    4.587  0.032   
  control  0.870  0.351   
  beta  0.757  0.384   
  beta.ind  0.191  0.662   
  beta.dif  0.501  0.479   
  earning  3.433  0.064   
  employ  2.214  0.137   
  debt.eq   4.221   0.037   
         
2.  Forward Stepwise      
         
   Model  Summary     
         
  step -2 log   cox &Snell Nagelkerke R                       
    likelihood R square Square     
  1 42.513 0.14 0.221     
  2 38.512 0.206 0.326     
  3 35.096 0.258 0.409     
         
   Variables in the equation    
         
step variables   SE Wald significance   
1 constant 0.457 0.745 0.376 0.540   
  div.payout 0.035   3.195 0.074   
2 constant 1.085 0.859 1.594 0.207   
  div.payout 0.058   5.187 0.023   
  debt.eq 1.941   4.667     
3 constant 4.259 2.140 3.960 0.047   
  div.payout 0.125   6.365 0.012   
  debt.eq 2.140   5.976 0.015   
  beta.ind 3.944   2.778 0.096   
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TABLE IV 
 
This Table presents the results regarding the relationship between the grant of ESO plans, risk  
and debt ratio (debt.eq) for various levels of control,  or the relationship between the grant of 
ESO plans and control for various level of  relative risk (diff). 
Regressions 
Results               
1  diff  = 0.00443 + -0.35017 ESO 
   (Low level of control, <15%) (.0399)  (-2.611) * 
      F : 6.82(.011)   
      R : 0.3081628   
      Adjusted R : 0.0810407   
      Standard E : 0.5091329   
2  diff  = -0.3231 + 0.32713 ESO 
   (High level of control,>15%) (-2.5571)  (2.3587) * 
      F : 5.56(.022)   
      R : 0.3136234   
      Adjusted R : 0.0806804   
      Standard E : 0.3791017   
3  beta  = 0.74143 + -0.1723 ESO 
   (Low level of control, <15%) (6.6119)  (-1.2732)   
      F : 1.62(.21)   
      R : 0.1559835   
      Adjusted R : 0.0093205   
      Standard E : 0.5138635   
4  beta  = 0.935 + 0.104091 ESO 
   (High level of control,>15%) (5.7296)  (0.5811)   
      F : .337(.56)   
      R : 0.0811149   
      Adjusted R : 0.0065796   
      Standard E : 0.4895569   
5  beta.ind  = 0.66942 + 0.17448 ESO 
   (Low level of control, <15%) (6.6527)  (1.4367)   
      F : 2.06(.15)   
      R : 0.1754468   
      Adjusted R : 0.0158705   
      Standard E : 0.4611161   
6  beta.ind  = 1.2666 + -0.02075 ESO 
   (High level of control,>15%) (10.3410)  (-1.5435)   
      F : 2.38(.12)   
      R : 0.211258   
      Adjusted R : 0.025897   
      Standard E : 0.367466   
7  debt.eq  = 0.29526 + 0.8696 ESO 
   (Low level of control, <15%) (1.0584)  (2.5339) * 
      F : 6.42(.01)   
      R : 0.3259892   
      Adjusted R : 0.0897184   
      Standard E : 1.2159267   
8  debt.eq  = 0.3025 + 2.8869 ESO 
   (High level of control,>15%) (.0678)  (0.5896)   
      F : 0.34(.55)   
      R : 0.0875506   
      Adjusted R : 0.0076651   
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Regressions 
Results               
      Standard E : 12.616449   
9  control  = 33.4785 + -19.0615 ESO 
   Low level of risk  , diff<0 (7.2829)  (-3.616) * 
      F : 13.07(.00)   
      R : 0.3991627   
      Adjusted R : 0.1471472   
      Standard E : 18.953375   
10  control  = 5.3782 + 14.6373 ESO 
   High level of risk, diff>0 (1.5243)  (3.5558) * 
      F : 12.64(.00)   
      R : 0.4604301   
      Adjusted R : 0.1952299   
          Standard E : 12.721541   
* Significant at 5% or less. 
 
